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Social Media: Insight on the Internal Dynamics of Mexican
DTOs
Abstract
Recent literature analyzes the use of social media by terrorist organizations, gangs, and
other criminal groups. Despite the valuable insight that this approach provides on these
actors, the use of social media by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) remains
largely understudied. This study provides information on the scope and nature of Mexican
DTOs’ online presence, a demographic snapshot of their users, and insight into the internal
dynamics of these organizations through the systematic study of primary-source data
collected from 150 Facebook accounts likely to belong to members of Mexican DTOs. This
information gleaned from social media has the potential to enrich our knowledge and
understanding of these organizations and to serve as a guide for more effective and
assertive anti-narcotics policies and strategies in Mexico and Latin America. Finally, this
study raises new questions and provides avenues for future research on specific issues and
trends related to DTOs observed throughout the analysis.
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Introduction
Today, Mexican DTOs pose the most direct and severe security threat to the
Mexican State, and represent one of the most significant sources of instability
in Latin America. The recurrent failure of national and international antinarcotics strategies in the past decades and the continued empowerment of
these criminal organizations demonstrate a persistent and widespread lack of
understanding of the nature, character, and internal dynamics of these actors.
In this context, it is clear that new approaches to the study of Mexican DTOs
are urgently needed.
In recent years, scholars and law enforcement agencies around the world have
started to analyze the use of social media by members of terrorist
organizations and gangs. This analysis has contributed to a better
understanding of the social networks and internal dynamics of these groups.
However, despite the growing significance of this practice in the fields of
terrorism and crime, the use of social media by members of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) remains largely understudied. The present
study intends to contribute to the literature in the field by providing first
systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of the use of Facebook by
members of Mexican drug cartels. For this study, primary-source data was
collected from 150 Facebook accounts likely belonging to members of six
Mexican DTOs. The data was analyzed over a three-month period. The
analysis sheds light on the scope and nature of the use of Facebook by
members of these organizations and addresses controversial themes such as
recruiting, the spread of narco-culture, and the use of this platform for
organizational purposes. This study further highlights the value of the
information that is available online, and intends to open a debate and spark
an interest in the use of the Internet in general, and social media in particular,
by members of DTOs in Mexico and Latin America for the development of
future research in the field.

Mexican DTOs Today
As Phil Williams stated during the 1990s, transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) pose a security threat at the individual, state, and
international system levels.1 This threat has only become more imminent and
Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security,”
Survival 36:1 (Spring, 1994): 96-113, available at:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR880/MR880
.ch14.pdf.
1
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complex in the last decades with the fast-paced developments in
transportation, telecommunications, and economic activities inherent to
globalization. As transnational criminal organizations, Mexican DTOs have
taken advantage of these developments to expand their activities and
influence. Today, these groups are indisputably the most powerful criminal
actors in Mexico and some of the most influential in the region. Their
capacity to interrupt the provision of a safe environment and damage the
social fabric of the country (individual level), to challenge the state monopoly
of violence (state level), and to penetrate neighboring states (international
system level), evidences the alarming security threat that these organizations’
power and activities pose today.
Despite the multiple national and international anti-narcotics efforts in
Mexico such as the Merida Initiative2 and the War on Drugs, Mexican DTOs
continue to gain power and control over the country. The constant failure of
these strategies demonstrates the persistent misunderstanding of these
organizations and their members, and highlights the urgency to develop new
approaches to enrich our knowledge of these actors. Similar concerns grew in
the field of terrorism after it became evident that the policies implemented
after the 9/11 attacks had failed to significantly reduce the incidence of
terrorism, and terrorists were adapting rapidly to counterterrorism policies
and technological advances.
The analysis of social media has gained relevance as an alternative approach
to the study of terrorist organizations, particularly since the emergence of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013. In 2015, Jytte Klausen
demonstrated that social media is a valuable source of insight and intelligence
on the internal dynamics of ISIS.3 Klausen analyzed 59 Twitter accounts
belonging to Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.4 Similarly, “The
Twitter Census,”5 which analyzed 20,000 Twitter accounts belonging to ISIS
supporters, highlighted the value of the information and insight on a terrorist
organization and its members that could be obtained from the analysis of
“Merida Initiative,” U.S. State Department, available at:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/.
3 Jytte Klausen, "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters
in Syria and Iraq," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (December 9, 2014) available at:
http://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/28992/KlausenArticle2014.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y.
4 Ibid.
5 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census. Defining and Describing
the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” Brookings, March 5, 2015, available at:
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describingthe-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/.
2
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social media accounts. Winter concluded that social media has become a
powerful vehicle for the massive dissemination of propaganda6 and Fisher
highlighted the importance of understanding terrorists’ use of the Internet,
and in particular, terrorists’ use of social media platforms such as Twitter,
Facebook, YouTube, and Tumblr in order to generate efficient counterterrorism strategies.7 Furthermore, think tanks and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as the Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI)8 and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,9 are increasingly
devoting resources to the analysis of terrorists’ online activity. These are only
a few examples of recent efforts that highlight the growing importance of the
analysis of social media to gain insight and intelligence into terrorist
organizations.
Similar research has been incorporated into the study of criminal
organizations and, in particular, to the study of gangs in recent years. Womer
and Bunker conducted one of the first qualitative studies in the field in order
to better understand how “Sureños gangs” and Mexican DTOs were using the
Internet, and how their use of this tool could be compared with that of
terrorist organizations.10 Through several keyword searches in common
Internet search engines, the authors identified those websites in these groups
that had a larger footprint, and then analyzed the purpose of their presence
on these platforms. The study found that Sureños gangs tend to use these
platforms to “brag about their exploits” and to “notify members of meetings
and events.” Womer and Bunker concluded that that Mexican DTOs utilized
the Internet for the same purposes, but had a notable engagement in the
promotion of narco-culture, narco-religion, and narco-lifestyle. Building
upon Womer and Bunker’s contributions, Décary-Hétu and Morselli
conducted a keyword search through the search engines of Facebook and
Twitter and found that Canadian gang members are increasingly participating

Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda
Strategy” Quilliam, 2015, available at: https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-statespropaganda-strategy.pdf.
7 Ali Fisher and Nico Purcha, “Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for
Jihadist Propaganda,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 25, 2013,
available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tweeting-for-the-caliphate-twitter-asthe-new-frontier-for-jihadist-propaganda.
8 See: http://www.memri.org/.
9 See: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/.
10 Sarah Womer and Robert J Bunker, "Sureños Gangs and Mexican Cartel Use of Social
Networking Sites," Small Wars & Insurgencies 21:1 (2010): 81-94; Womer and Bunker
refer to gangs from Central America, and in particular, from Guatemala, El Salvador and
Honduras as Sureños gangs.
6
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on social networking sites.11 Such participation is highly individualized and
there is significant interaction between gang members on these platforms.
Similar to Womer and Bunker, the authors conclude that the promotion and
exhibition of gang culture online is a factor that could facilitate the process of
recruitment in the real world and that social networking sites make “criminal
groups a more accessible phenomenon for a larger portion of the population”
by creating new spaces that enable the interaction of gang members with a
“wide number of people who would probably never have been exposed to their
lifestyle through physical interactions.”12
Castillo has analyzed the use of Facebook by Mexican DTOs as a tool of
asymmetrical warfare.13 According to Castillo, Mexican DTOs are resorting to
“persuasive and coercive messaging conducted through print, audiovisual,
cultural and electronic media” in the war against the Mexican State. In his
study, Castillo notes that the Internet in general, and social media platforms
such as Facebook in particular, are being used by DTOs as a tool to promote
their lifestyle and to coerce their audience. Along these lines, Campbell has
argued that narco-propaganda should be treated as “a powerful political
discourse.”14 Like Guevara,15 Campbell has conducted a systematic study of
narco-propaganda expressions such as videos, graffiti, blogs, narco-corridos,
and the use of mass media. However, while Castillo Campbell and Guevara
provide a systematic and qualitative analysis of the content being shared on
social media by Mexican DTOs, their studies do not provide quantitative
insight of the scope of the online presence of the members of these
organizations and their internal dynamics. Furthermore, their work does not
discuss the differences and similarities in the use of Facebook or social media
across DTOs.
With only several notable exceptions such as Womer and Bunker and Castillo,
the study of the social media presence of Mexican DTO members is usually
approached from a journalistic perspective. Since 2012, Mexican and
international media outlets have capitalized on the exposure of the luxurious
David Décary-Hétu and Carlo Morselli, "Gang Presence in Social Network Sites,"
International Journal of Cyber Criminology 5:2 (2011): 876- 890, available at:
http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/davidcarlo2011julyijcc.pdf.
12 Ibid.
13 Juan-Camilo Castillo, “The Mexican Cartels' Employment of Inform and Influence
Activities (IIA) as Tools of Asymmetrical Warfare,” available at:
http://icsa.cs.up.ac.za/issa/2014/Proceedings/Workshop/3_Final_Document.pdf.
14 Howard Campbell, “Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War,” Latin American
Perspectives 41:2 (March 1, 2014): 60-77.
15 America Y. Guevara, "Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War," Journal of Strategic Security
6:3 (2013): 131-151.
11
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lifestyles of the Mexican DTOs’ elite. The articles often include pictures from
Instagram and Twitter accounts allegedly belonging to DTO members, and
lack significant analysis on the images or the accounts. In 2015 José Luis
Montenegro, a Mexican journalist, published a book titled “Narco Juniors,”16
which covered the issue of the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel’s elite on
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The author takes a look at the luxurious
lifestyle of the “narco juniors,” the sons and daughters of top cartel leaders, by
analyzing more than 70 Twitter accounts belonging to these individuals and
conducting interviews with important members of the organization.
Montenegro concludes that the exposure of the luxurious lifestyle of the narco
juniors on social media and the openness of top leaders of the organization to
be interviewed evidences the widespread impunity that the organization’s
elite enjoys. While these journalistic contributions demonstrate that Mexican
DTOs have a significant and visible presence on social media, they have
remained superficial and sensationalistic, lacking rigor and a systematic
approach. Furthermore, the fact that these works have focused solely on the
elite of Mexican DTOs is not only reductionist in nature, as the elite only
represents a minority of the group, but is also a direct contribution to the
distortion of the reality of the Mexican DTO lifestyle, and to the
reinforcement of the aspirational model that these organizations already
represent for many.
While the academic discussion on the role of social media in narcopropaganda,17 drug-related violence,18 and narco-culture19 is growing, none of
the academic contributions are based on actual studies and analyses of social
media nor refer to concrete qualitative or quantitative studies in the field. In
this context, the cyber presence of Mexican DTOs has been mostly treated as
common knowledge in academia. To date, there is no concrete evidence of
the scope and nature of the presence of Mexican DTO members on social
media and there is no consensus on the nature of these groups’ activities
online. This is despite the fact that the study of these elements in other fields
Montenegro, José Luis, Narco Juniors (Mexico City, Mexico: Penguin Random House
Grupo Editorial Mexico, 2015).
17 Lou Gullec, “Communication as a Weapon: Propaganda in the Mexican Drug War,”
2015available at: https://infocusrevue.com/2015/03/13/communication-as-a-weaponpropaganda-in-the-mexican-drug-war/.
18 Max G. Manwaring, “A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security
Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies,” Strategic Studies Institute,
September 2009, available at:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=940.
19 Alma Guillermoprieto, "The Narcovirus," Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies
(Spring 2009): 3-9, available at:
http://clasarchive.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/Spring2009/pdf/BRLASSpring2009-full.pdf.
16
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(e.g., terrorism, criminal gangs) has proven highly beneficial to understanding
the organizations in question.

Methodology
For the purposes of this study, the author collected and analyzed primary
source data from the observation and documentary analysis of 150 active
Facebook accounts likely to belong to members of the six most prominent
Mexican DTOs: Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán
Leyva Organization, the Caballeros Templarios, and La Familia Michoacana.
Primary data was collected through a broad keyword search conducted on
Facebook’s built-in search engine, following the model implemented by
Womer and Bunker20 and Décary-Hétu and Morelli.21 The keywords used for
this search were: Los Zetas, Los Zs, Grupo Los Zetas, Cartel del Golfo, CDG,
Cartel de Sinaloa, CDS, Virus Antrax, Escuela Virus Antrax, Los Antrax,
Empresa MZ, Empresa Mario Zambada, Empresa Quintero, Familia
Michoacana, La Nueva Fuerza Michoacana, Caballeros Templarios,
Templario, Templarios, Beltrán Leyva, Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, Empresa
Beltrán Leyva, BL, among others.
Each account found in the keyword search was analyzed and incorporated
into a database, which included variables and sub variables for the analysis of
the scope, demographics, and internal dynamics of these groups. Only those
accounts that exhibited an explicit affiliation to the cartel, account activity in
the last two months, and a network of at least 200 friends were included. The
product of the process of primary source data collection was a comprehensive
dataset that allowed me to define the scope of the presence and footprint of
Mexican DTOs on Facebook. Every account was analyzed thoroughly using
qualitative and quantitative methods. This analysis included, but was not
limited to, the analysis of the content posted by the user between 2014 and
2016, the comments in such posts, the photographs included in the account
dated from 2015 and 2016, the content shared by the user such as generic
images, videos, etc. and the account’s network of friends to identify other
members of the organization.
Due to the sensitive nature of this study, an alternative Facebook account was
created on January 2016. All of the searches were conducted through this
account and this study was at all times discrete and indirect, as no interaction
or contact with the account owners was established.
20
21

Womer and Bunker, "Sureños gangs.”
Décary-Hétu and Morselli, "Gang Presence in Social Network Sites.”
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First, studies in the field of terrorism, crime, and sociology have
demonstrated that “Facebook constitutes a rich site for researchers interested
in the affordances of social networks due to its heavy usage patterns and
technological capacities that bridge online and offline connections.”22
However, as the literature review for this study demonstrates, few qualitative
and quantitative studies have been conducted on Facebook with the purpose
of understanding the internal dynamics of DTOs and gangs in general, and
Mexican DTOs in particular. Second, Facebook is one of the most popular
social media sites in the world, and in particular in Latin America23 and in
Mexico.24 According to a 2016 study conducted by IAB Mexico, Facebook is
currently the most popular social media platform in Mexico.25 Today, 97% of
Mexicans with access to Internet have a Facebook account.26 Finally, as
Décary-Hétu and Morelli noted in their study, the reduced level of privacy at
Facebook sites over recent years has created “a goldmine of information for
researchers.”27 The methods employed in this study intend to create a model,
which can be replicated to analyze the behavior of criminal groups in this and
other social networking platforms in future research efforts.

The Scope of the Online Presence of Mexican DTOs
More than 350 accounts associated with the selected Mexican DTOs were
identified throughout this study. Of those, 150 active and likely authentic
accounts were included in the analysis. This demonstrates that members of
Mexican DTOs are actively engaging in the use of social media, and
specifically, in the use of Facebook. Table 1, below, presents the distribution
of these 150 accounts by cartel as well as some basic summary statistics.

Nicole B Ellison, Charles Steinfield and Cliff Lampe, "The Benefits of Facebook
‘‘Friends:’’ Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites,"
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 12:3 (July, 2007): 1143–1168, available
at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00367.x/full.
23 According to The Statistics Portal, there are over 230 million active Facebook users in
Latin America; See: “Number of Facebook Users in Latin America from 2014 to 2019 (in
millions),” Statista (2106) available at:
http://www.statista.com/statistics/282350/number-of-facebook-users-in-latinamerica/.
24 According to a 2014 article posted in latinink.com, 90% of Internet users in Mexico
have a Facebook account. Mexico has 65 million Internet users. See: Fernando Gimenez,
“4 Key Growth Areas Among Mexican Internet Users in 2015,” Latin Link, December
2014, available at: http://latinlink.usmediaconsulting.com/2014/12/4-key-growthareas-among-mexican-Internet-users-in-2015/.
25 Estudio de consumo y medios dispositivos entre internautas mexicanos, IAB Mexico,
March 2016, available at: http://www.iabmexico.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/IABMx-ECMyD2016.pdf
26 Ibid.
27 Décary-Hétu and Morselli, "Gang Presence in Social Network Sites."
22
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Table 1. The scope of the presence and activity of members of
Mexican DTOs on Facebook

Mexican
DTO

Number of
active
accounts as
of April
2016

Average of
friends
and
followers
per
account

Number
of open
accounts

Number
of private
or semiprivate
accounts

Beltrán Leyva
Organization

12

1,163

7

5

Caballeros
Templarios

12

358

9

3

Gulf Cartel

17

145

12

5

La Familia
Michoacana

3

346

3

0

Los Zetas

33

893

29

4

Sinaloa Cartel

73

2,966

42

31

Total

150

978

102

48

How are Mexican DTOs using Facebook?
The findings of this study suggest that Mexican DTO members use Facebook
primarily for personal reasons. It is important to note that there are
significant differences, however, in the use of social media across the
members of each organization and that the nature, culture, and internal
dynamics of each group have a significant impact on how its members use
social media.
For example, members of the Sinaloa Cartel use the platform to concisely and
effectively communicate with the members of the organization, but most
importantly, with civil society. The Sinaloa Cartel behave as “celebrities” and
communicate with their “fans” through comments and posts. The users
usually use the terms “plebe”28 and “compa”29 to refer to themselves, their
The term “plebe” is short for “plebeyo” which means “plebeian.” This term is used in a
friendly manner rather than in a disrespectful way in the state of Sinaloa. Even highranking members of the Sinaloa Cartel refer to themselves as “plebes.”
29 The term “compa” is short for “compadre” which means “co-father.” This term is used
between men to indicate a bond of friendship and trust. This term is commonly used
between male members of the Sinaloa Cartel.
28
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friends, and their followers in a friendly and approachable tone particular of
the state of Sinaloa. On average, every Sinaloa Cartel affiliated account has a
network of 2,966 friends and followers (Table 1). Furthermore, only 2% of the
Sinaloa Cartel accounts are private, which indicates that the members of the
organization want to be seen and “followed” on social media, and are
interested in making their lives public. It is evident that the Sinaloa Cartel is
the most popular and supported Mexican DTO today, and that the
organization is regarded as an aspirational model for civil society and even
other DTOs such as the Beltrán Leyva Organization, the Gulf Cartel, and the
Caballeros Templarios.
In contrast, members of Los Zetas tend to use Facebook in a highly individual
fashion, specifically to brag and show off their lifestyle and their possessions.
A significant tendency towards violence and aggression is notorious, which
contrasted sharply with the rest of the organizations. The members of Los
Zetas also share significantly more content, particularly images, showing
drugs and their use of these substances. This observation is significant in the
context of the debate over the nature and structure of Los Zetas. Scholars and
journalists have claimed that this organization has “no morals” and does not
follow any “codes of conduct,”30 as opposed to other organizations, and the
online behavior of its members confirms these claims.
In contrast with Los Zetas, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, La
Familia Michoacana, and the Caballeros Templarios do not appear to seek
public attention or popularity through social media platforms. They have
comparatively few accounts and friends/followers (Table 1). This could be
related to the “social” and “religious” components behind the ideology of
these organizations.

The Individual vs. the Organization
Eighty-three percent of the total accounts identified across all DTOs are
personal accounts, which means that they are owned by an individual who
identifies him or herself as such, and only 17% are official pages, which are
accounts created under the name of the organization (Figure 1).

Max G. Manwaring, “A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security
Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies,” Strategic Studies Institute,
September 2009, available at:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=940.
30
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Figure 1. Account Type
8%
9%

23%

60%

Personal
Personl and fan page
Official
Official and fan page

In contrast with the rest of the organizations, all of the accounts belonging to
La Familia Michoacana operate as open accounts (Table 1) under the name of
the organization, revealing no individual identities, and are mostly used to
share narco-messages. In the last decade, Mexican DTOs have resorted to
using different channels to communicate with civil society, the government,
and their enemies, the most emblematic communication channels being the
“narco mantas” or “narco-banners,” which are “painted signs, manifestos,
and graffiti,”31 created by Mexican DTOs. Today, we see this trend replicated
in social media. Mexican DTOs are not only embracing the benefits of
technology, but are finding in social media a free and uncensored space which
allows them to communicate massively without depending on the media,32 a
trend also observed among terrorist organizations.33

Individualism and Narco-Culture
In their study, Décary-Hétu and Morselli found that “gang presence on social
networking sites is linked primarily to the promotion of a general gang or
street culture through individual displays.”34 This study discovered a
Guillermoprieto, "The Narcovirus."
In Mexico the media has agreed to not display or comment narco-banners and their
content as it is believed to empower these organizations by allowing their message to
reach a massive audience, which is the ultimate goal of these displays. In this context, the
Internet offers Mexican DTOs independence from the media and a massive platform to
spread their messages.
33 Bruce Hoffman, “The Old Media, Terrorism, and Public Opinion,” in Inside Terrorism
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006).
34 David Décary-Hétu and Carlo Morselli, "Crime Facilitation Purposes of Social
Networking Sites: A Review and Analysis of the “Cyberbanging” Phenomenon," Law
Enforcement and Policy Branch Public Safety Canada, Report #015, 2010, available at:
31

32
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pronounced tendency of the users to share “selfies,” comments, images, and
posts where they brag about themselves and their lifestyles as DTO members.
While this study found a significant amount of expressions of narco-culture
through individual displays, the “promotion” of narco-culture by DTO
members appears to be an unconscious effect of their presence online, rather
than an orchestrated, collective effort to promote it in every DTO, except in
the case of the Sinaloa Cartel and its sub-group, Virus Antrax. This study also
found important differences in narco-culture across cartels. For example, it is
clear that the Sinaloa Cartel possesses a unique ideology that is well rooted in
the organization and the social life in the state of Sinaloa. At the center of this
ideology is a widespread personality cult towards its leader, El Chapo
Guzmán, a phenomenon not observed in any other group. The personality
cult is not only predominant within the ranks of the organization, where the
members openly express their desire to serve, protect, and die for “El Jefe,”
“El Señor,” or “The Lord,” but also in the everyday life of Sinaloa’s society,
where the average citizen is proud to protect or assist the organization and its
leader. In the last year, especially since Guzmán’s latest capture by the
authorities in January 2016, the manifestations of support for the leader have
proliferated on Facebook.
In contrast, the narco-culture in the state of Michoacán revolves around
modesty and values associated with the rural working class. Religious
elements and an ideology of “socialism” are at the core of the culture of these
organizations. A 2014 New York Times article mentioned that La Familia
Michoacana had “boasted a primitive, pseudo-religious ideology and claimed
to be concerned with bettering the lives of the citizens of Michoacán.”35
Overall, this organization claims to have a “social duty.” In some Facebook
posts identified throughout this study, the organization expresses that it will
“perform the activities that the authorities are incapable of performing,” and
that it is “here to serve the society.” Another post stated that the
organization’s duty is “to guard the order in the state and to prevent robbery,
extortions, kidnappings, corruption and abuses from the government.” The
social character of this organization and its direct references to the
deficiencies of the government are unique in the spectrum of Mexican DTOs.
This trait of the group could be the reason behind the somewhat modest
behavior of its users on social media (Table 1), which contrasts with the overhttp://gangsquebec.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Crime-Facilitation-Purposesof-Social-Networking-Sites-A-Review-and-Analysis-of-the-CyberbangingPhenomenon.pdf.
35 Enrique Krauze, "Mexico’s Vigilantes on the March," New York Times, February 3,
2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/opinion/krauze-mexicosvigilantes-on-the-march.html?_r=0.
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exposed members of the rest of the organizations. Another explanation could
be that the social base of support of La Familia Michoacana and Caballeros
Templarios is significantly different to that of the DTOs located in the north of
Mexico. In this scenario, the groups’ efforts to recruit and promote the
organization contrast significantly with those of other DTOs. The Michoacán
groups clearly center their efforts to appeal to society in reinforcing and
fueling the widespread social discontent and dissatisfaction with the
government, while other organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel emphasize
narco-culture and a way out of poverty or social bond in their branding and
outreach strategies.

The Absence of Privacy
Seventy-five percent of the analyzed accounts have no privacy settings. In a
country where 98% of crimes go unpunished each year, according to INEGI,36
DTO members are proud of their affiliation to these organizations and have
no fear of being identified and associated with these groups by their
immediate circle of friends and family, their community, nor by law
enforcement agencies. DTO members are confident that they will not be
brought to justice and, therefore, feel free to display their affiliation to
Mexican DTOs with pride in social media. The openess of the analyzed
accounts also provided significant insight into the network of friends and
followers of the members of Mexican DTOs. Each of the analyzed accounts
are connected to an average of 978 users (Table 1) who are aware of the users’
affiliation to a criminal organization. This observation also provides a clear
picture of the growing “mainstrimization” of the narco-affiliation and the
narco-lifestyle, as Guevara has noted.37 The normalization of these criminal
groups and their activities, particularily in the most marginalized
communities, should be at the center of law enforcement agencies’ concerns,
but somehow remains ignored. These findings inevitably raise questions
about the efficiency of law enforcement agencies in Mexico, about the
rampant levels of impunity that these criminal organizations enjoy, and about
the collusion of the authorities with these groups. As Montenegro concluded
in his book, it is alarming and indignating how much information about the
members of Mexican DTOs is available online and how few arrests and
convictions actually take place.38
36See:

http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/metodologias/envipe/marco_concep
tual_envipe.pdf.
37 Guevara, "Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War."
38 Montenegro, Narco Juniors.
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Demographics
Although men primarily comprise the membership of Mexican DTOs (Figure
2), as the literature suggests, these groups are increasingly resorting to the
recruitment and empowerment of youngsters. According to the results of this
study, the average Mexican DTO member with an active presence on
Facebook today is between 20 and 30 years old (Table 2). In general, it is
evident that the many individuals within the younger generations envision
Mexican DTOs as an aspirational model.

Figure 2. Gender
Not
available

7%
Female
17%

Male
76%

Male

Female

Does not apply

Table 2. Age
Age

Percentage of
DTO
members

Teen

7%

20s

31%

30s or more

15%

Data unavailable

47%

This study confirmed the speculations about Los Zetas increasingly relying on
teenagers. Today, 90% of the members of Los Zetas who are active on
Facebook report that they are between 15 and 30 years of age; 39% of its
members are teenagers (see Table 3 in Appendix). Most of Los Zetas’
members who are active on Facebook seem to be low-ranking and live in
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conditions of poverty where teen pregnancies, regular abuse of drugs and
alcohol, violence, and recurrent deaths in their families and immediate social
circles are part of their daily lives.
The results also suggest that 77% of the females involved in Los Zetas are
teenagers participating in the lowest ranks of the organization, which
demonstrates a growing trend of female involvement in the younger
generations. Most of the young women in the organization are depicted
wearing a set of radios and cell phones, which indicate their role as
“halcones”39 or “hawks.” Others are observed displaying bags of cocaine and
marijuana, apparently for distribution. The majority enjoys posting selfies of
themselves in sexualized contexts and displaying guns, portraying themselves
as seductive killers. In “The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central
America,” George W. Grayson noted that women are increasingly
participating in Mexican DTOs and are assuming roles that often involve
seducing a rival to negotiate an agreement or to murder. The women
occupying these roles are called “panteras” or “panthers” and are increasingly
visible in the online activities of Mexican DTOs. Los Zetas is the most brutal
and violent organization in Mexico today, and therefore, the increasing
involvement of teenagers in this organization will inevitably have a significant
impact on the social fabric of the country in the next decade and will redefine
the dynamics of Mexican DTOs in the next decade.
Contrary to the trend observed in Los Zetas, the majority of the women in the
Sinaloa Cartel seem to be in their 20s or 30s (Appendix, Table 3), highranking and part of the organization’s “elite,” typically daughters, nieces, and
wives of the most influential families in the organization. All of the women
identify themselves as “Buchonas”: Highly sexualized and attractive women
with plastic surgeries, long hair, and usually tight clothes and high heels.
Most of the women tend to profile themselves as sex symbols but also as
“tough, ruthless women” or “femmes fatales.”40 Despite being part of the
elite, most of them display their capacities to use guns and to manage entire
squads within the organization. The females of the Sinaloa Cartel are actively
involved in operations and are respected and supported by the males of the

The word “halcones” refers to the people who are massively “subcontracted” by
Mexican DTOs to report suspicious activity to its actual members, such as the presence of
the army, the police, or rival organizations in their territory. These subcontracted
employees are usually taxi drivers, teenagers, and even transit officers. The organization
typically gives these employees a set of radios and cellphones to communicate with the
members of the group.
40 The women of the organization are proud to call themselves “cabronas.”
39
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group. One of them confessed to having killed for the first time in a post from
early 2016, and claimed that she would do it again to defend herself.

Internal Dynamics
The results of this study also provided significant insight into the internal
dynamics of the analyzed groups, demonstrating that the analysis of social
media provides access to valuable information that can enrich the knowledge
and understanding of Mexican DTOs and of their members as social beings.
Table 4 (in the Appendix) presents the results of an analysis of internal
dynamic variables across cartels.

Group Cohesiveness and Pride
The results in Table 4 indicate that the cartels with the strongest group
cohesiveness are La Familia Michoacana and the Sinaloa Cartel, while Los
Zetas and the Caballeros Templarios are the weakest. The analysis of the
accounts indicate that the nature of group cohesiveness could vary
significantly across DTOs.
Eighty-two percent of the members of Mexican DTOs studied here use
Facebook to brag about themselves and their lifestyle as members of their
organization (Appendix, Table 4). These displays often include references in
the form of photographs, comments, or posts in which the individual makes
reference to other members of the organization and his or her day-to-day
activities in the DTO. The analysis of these displays confirms that the
members of the Mexican DTO elite who are at the center of the journalistic
focus on DTOs’ use of social media represent only a small percentage of the
population analyzed in this study. It was also noted that these displays are
welcomed and encouraged by the users’ immediate network of friends,
showing that the narco-lifestyle has the ability to create an aspirational role
model that seems accessible for many and which is increasingly becoming
mainstream.
Meanwhile, 54% of the analyzed accounts display pride for the organization.
In the majority of the cases (73%), the users resort to generic images to
express pride for the organization. These images usually include the name or
logo of the DTO with particular codes, insignias, and other emblematic
images. In terms of narco-corridos, 40% of the accounts share videos or lyrics
of narco-corridos that make reference to the organization of their affiliation
(Appendix, Table 4). The members of the Sinaloa Cartel (54%) and the
Beltrán Leyva Organization (50%) tend to share narco-corridos to express
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pride of their organization the most. The Gulf Cartel (25%) and Los Zetas
(24%) also resort to narco-corridos but do so with less frequency. This could
be related to the scarce social support and popularity that these two
organizations have in comparison to that of the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán
Leyva Organization.
Forty-nine percent of the analyzed accounts display an affiliation to a
Mexican DTO in the “works at” section in the users’ profile. It is evident that
that the drug trade is increasingly perceived as a labor market and a formal
business. Members of groups such as the Sinaloa Cartel refer to the criminal
organization as “the enterprise” or “the company,” labels that demonstrate
not only the respect for the organization but the growing consolidation of
these organizations as legitimate economic alternatives for the working class.
These labels have redefined the morals around these groups by diminishing
the negative connotation associated with the drug trade industry and by
justifying its existence as a legitimate business that provides jobs. This
capacity to legitimize and rebrand drug-related activities to the point where
they are no longer synonymous with crime, shame, and evil in the collective
imaginary has been one of the most successful strategies of the Sinaloa Cartel
since its origin and it is one of the most visible aspects of its members’ activity
on Facebook today.

Group Structure
In recent years, academic and journalistic literature has made repeated
references to the pronounced fragmentation of Mexican DTOs into smaller
cells or sub-groups. The processes of “balkanization”41 and fragmentation
pose significant challenges for law enforcement agencies trying to understand
and weaken these groups and has led to increasing violence in several states.
This study uncovered important data on the existence of sub-groups, the
hierarchy of these groups, their tactics, and the recruitment dynamics within
these groups.
This research confirmed the existence of a Los Zetas sub-group called Nectar
Lima. While the Internet is plagued with narco-corridos and music related to
the group, there is no literature on the Nectar Lima sub-group. The analysis
here revealed that the group is mainly composed of teenagers (under the age
of 20), and some are as young as 15 years old. There is a significant

“Mexico’s Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges,” Stratfor, April 18,
2013, available at: https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-drug-war-balkanizationleads-regional-challenges.
41
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involvement of females in the group, a significant contrast with other
organizations and the main cell of Los Zetas. According to the information
collected from their social media accounts, these young members serve in the
lowest positions of the sub-group, operating as mules or halcones for the
organization, although most of them describe their ranking as “Commander
of Nectar Lima.” In their totality, the members of the sub-group belong to the
lower socio-economic classes and live in poor areas and dysfunctional
environments. Most of the women are highly sexualized and some openly
engage in prostitution, using Facebook to advertise. The men display highly
sexualized images, videos, comments, and posts and often seek sexual
relations through the platform.
The findings of this study also provide significant insight into the Sinaloa
Cartel’s sub-group Virus Antrax, to which 54% of the users claim an
affiliation. The sub-group Virus Antrax is the enforcement arm of the Sinaloa
Cartel, and its primary goal is to murder the group’s enemies. One of the
most significant elements identified are the high levels of pride expressed by
its members. The majority identifies as “Hitmen” and often talk about death
as something they embrace and respect. Members of the group are devoted to
the Holy Death and, most importantly, show their desire and their will to
serve “The Boss,” El Chapo. The information provided by the users in their
Facebook accounts speaks of a high cohesion inside the sub-group and of a
high level of trust and loyalty within its members. The users venerate their
duties as part of the organization and the leaders tend to encourage the lowerranking members through gifts and public recognition. Members of Virus
Antrax often receive a diamond ring in the shape of a skull (the organization’s
symbol), a diamond watch with a skull, or a pistol covered in gold or
diamonds when they achieve something or do something “courageous” for the
organization. No other group or sub-group analyzed in this study displayed
similar devotion, loyalty, and commitment from its members towards the
organization and its leaders.
Furthermore, it was surprising to find that 22% of all analyzed accounts
display strategic and tactical information on the organization’s activities. The
most common information of this type being shared on Facebook is the users’
telephone number and/or “BB Pin.”42 The data revealed that the vast
majority of DTO members use WhatsApp and BlackBerry messenger to
communicate with each other. This trend is also visible in terrorist
A BB Pin is BlackBerry’s Personal Identification Number which allows its users to
communicate through a free messaging application (BlackBerry Messenger) with other
Blackberry users.
42
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organizations such as ISIS. WhatsApp is known for providing significant
encryption features, while BlackBerry is known as the “safest” telephone in
the world.43 Members commonly share their new number in a regular post
and ask their network of friends to “add them” or to contact them. This study
also found that DTO members who share information considered as “tactical”
in this study often share their current location and their travel plans and
details. The users often post comments and images of themselves arriving to
a certain destination and they usually comment on the purpose of their trip.
In several cases, members expose who they are pursuing and what the
purpose of their mission is in certain cities. These posts are often
accompanied by images of the users “on the field,” carrying guns in trucks and
covering their faces with masks.

Recruitment
The literature reviewed for this study frequently mentions the use of social
media by Mexican DTOs to recruit new members.44 However, these
discussions do not make reference to any concrete studies. This study found
that there are only a few, and apparently isolated, efforts to recruit new
members through Facebook within the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia
Michoacana. In the Sinaloa Cartel only 3% of members with an active
presence on Facebook have displayed explicit efforts to recruit new members.
According to the information in these accounts, the recruitment takes place in
Facebook’s private messaging system, as those interested are redirected to
this platform. One of the accounts belonging to a female member of Virus
Antrax was identified soliciting 20 security escorts through a self-generated
post. Her post had over 30 replies of users offering their services, some of
them women. The other user used the platform to ask, “is anybody here a
Kaibil?”45 and to comment that he was hiring Kaibiles. In the case of La
Familia Michoacana, the recruitment efforts of members presented different

According to a ZD Net article, “BlackBerrys are, at least for now, one of the very few
mobile devices approved by the US government for low-level classification document
sharing, but the iPhone is not far behind.” See: Zack Whittaker, “Obama’s Gadgets: What
Tech Does the President Use?” ZD Net, February 16, 2016, available at:
http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/presidential-gadgets-what-technology-does-obamause/6/.
44 Guevara, "Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War."
45 A Kaibil is a member of Guatemala’s special operation military forces. It is well known
that Mexican DTOs are increasingly recruiting Kaibiles due to their readiness to join
these organizations and their professional military training. This trend was started by Los
Zetas but has been followed by other organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel. See: James
Bargent, “US Reports Shows Zetas Corruption of Guatemala’s Special Forces,” Insight
Crime, November 8, 2014, available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/usreport-shows-zetas-corruption-of-guatemalas-special-forces.
43
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traits. One of the accounts often displays pictures of various women who the
user claims are “prostitutes of the organization.” The user stated that if
anyone was interested in having access to these women, they had to join the
organization.
Overall, it is possible to conclude that Mexican DTO members are not actively
and consciously engaging in recruitment efforts through social media
platforms. This argument is reinforced by the fact that DTOs are viewed as an
aspirational model for many, and that entire families, couples, and groups of
friends are involved in these organizations, which indicates that recruitment
could most likely take place in-person and through acquaintances. However,
the exposure to the narco-lifestyle and its glamorization on social media is
reaching communities that it would probably not reach otherwise, as DécaryHétu and Morelli have argued. In this context, it is possible to argue that,
while Mexican DTO members are not actively seeking to recruit new members
through social media yet, their online activities are enriching and
consolidating a solid supply of human capital that is increasingly reaching out
to these organizations through social media or because of social media.

Relations across Mexican DTOs
The study of these social media accounts confirmed the allegations that some
organizations are building temporary alliances to defeat Los Zetas. The
information found in the accounts associated with the Gulf Cartel, the Beltrán
Leyva Organization, and the Sinaloa Cartel indicate that these three
organizations are now in a strategic alliance to eliminate Los Zetas from the
north of Mexico. In the case of the Beltrán Leyva Organization, 58% of the
users mentioned the Sinaloa Cartel and its sub-group, Virus Antrax, as the
group’s allies. This study found that the Caballeros Templarios also claim an
alliance to the Sinaloa Cartel in order to expel Los Zetas from Michoacán.
This study also found that the users mostly use Facebook to build an image of
power for themselves and the organization, rather than actively engaging in
cyber-conflict.46 Despite the fact that each organization uses Facebook to
interact in a different way with its rivals, in general, the dynamic is centered

Several law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and in Europe observing gang activity on
social media have warned that the confrontation that starts online translate into direct
violent confrontations in the real world.
46
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on the empowerment of the organization rather than in launching direct
attacks against the enemy.47

Relations with the State
Contrary to what was initially expected, Mexican DTO members do not resort
to Facebook to conduct attacks against their rivals, nor against the
government. Only 7% of the analyzed accounts make threats or display
intimidation efforts against the government, politicians, and law enforcement
agencies in Mexico. However, 21% of the users resort to the platform to make
references in the form of mockery or critique of the government, indicating
that Mexican DTOs are engaged in a dynamic of competition against the state
in terms of legitimacy and social support and, therefore, the members of these
organizations tend to share posts, images, and videos to discredit the
government, to evidence its weaknesses, and, most importantly, to
criminalize politicians and authorities. Overall, members of Mexican DTOs
tend to highlight the incompetence of the armed forces of Mexico and expose
acts of corruption and theft involving politicians. There is a growing
competition between DTOs and the government for legitimacy and public
support. While the efforts of members of Mexican DTOs to somehow damage
the reputation and credibility of the government and to win the hearts and
minds was surprising, a more concerning finding was the widespread success
of this tactic to engage civil society. Despite the geographical and cultural
differences across the analyzed organizations, when it comes to criticizing or
attacking the state, all of the groups enjoy widespread support from their
networks. No signs of rejection or efforts to defend the government from the
accusations of Mexican DTOs were identified in any of the groups. In this
context, it can be concluded that, as Castillo states, Mexican DTOs “have
developed comprehensive Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) strategies that
seek to gather support from civilians al coerce vulnerable government
institutions while at the same time weakening the resolve of their
opponents.”48
This observation also confirms that, contrary to what the government and
several academics have claimed about the nature of these organizations,
Mexican DTOs are increasingly involved in politics and are embracing an
unprecedented activist logic to manipulate politicians and law enforcement
officials and to compete with them in terms of support, credibility, and
These findings are exclusive to Facebook, and the dynamics could be different in other
platforms, such as YouTube where several organizations share gruesome videos of their
members torturing members of rival organizations.
48 Castillo, “The Mexican Cartels' Employment of Inform and Influence Activities.”
47
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legitimacy. This is one of the most worrisome trends observed throughout
this study. The already-damaged credibility of the Mexican state and growing
social discontent are likely to continue to deteriorate its legitimacy in the
following years; the use of social media by DTO members will play a
significant role in accelerating this process. The Mafia State49 that Mexico is
becoming will be empowered by the enmity and the growing apathy of the
Mexican people.

Conclusions and Future Research
Mexican DTOs pose the most alarming and direct threat to Mexico’s national
security today and are increasingly becoming a major source of instability in
the region. The repeated failure of national and international anti-narcotics
policies and strategies provide evidence of a profound and persistent lack of
understanding of these organizations. This study has argued that, in order to
generate a more comprehensive understanding, it is fundamental to gain
greater insight and intelligence on the groups’ nature, character, and internal
dynamics. A valuable source of this type of insight and intelligence today is
social media, which has been gaining relevance in the fields of terrorism and
criminology, but has remained underexplored in the field of Mexican DTOs.
The study conducted, collected, and analyzed primary data from 150
Facebook accounts currently active and likely to belong to members of
Mexican DTOs. The analysis determined the scope of these organizations’
presence on Facebook, generated a comprehensive demographic snapshot of
the members of Mexican DTOs with an active presence on the platform, and
provided insight into the internal dynamics of these criminal organizations.
These findings highlight the fact that, first, Mexican DTO members
predominantly use this platform in a highly individual fashion. Second, while
in most of the cases it is not their intention to promote or reinforce narcoculture as suggested in the literature, their use of Facebook is enabling the
proliferation and normalization of narco-culture by making it more
accessible, approachable, and by allowing it to reach people who would
probably not have been reached otherwise. Third, and contrary to what was
expected, it was not challenging to identify legitimate and active accounts for
analysis, and, surprisingly, most of the accounts have no privacy settings.
These observations evidence the need to increase the analysis of these free
and publicly available resources to understand criminal actors such as DTOs.
They also highlight the current situation of impunity and lack of law
See: Moises Naim, “Mafia States,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 212, available at:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-04-20/mafia-states.
49
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enforcement in Mexico. On Facebook, members of Mexican DTOs willingly
display their locations, their relatives and partners, their faces, their explicit
affiliation to and involvement in the organization, and themselves in
incriminating circumstances. Finally, to an alarming and unexpected degree,
Mexican DTO members are not only tolerated but supported, cheered,
encouraged, and admired by their network of friends, which often include
friends, relatives, and members of their communities.
In this sense, one of the greatest challenges that law enforcement agencies
face today and will continue to face in the near future when combating DTOs
is the growing social support, admiration, and normalization of DTO life and
activities in Mexico. In a country living in poverty and with widespread social
discontent, DTO members are admired anti-heroes. Furthermore, the
findings of this study highlight the pronounced differences across Mexican
DTOs in their nature, membership, and internal dynamics. The
particularities highlighted in this study suggest that anti-narcotics strategies
must necessarily be tailored to each organization, replacing the one-size-fitsall approach that has predominated in Mexico and in Latin America in the last
decades. Finally, the analysis presented here demonstrates quite clearly that
a more comprehensive understanding of Mexican DTOs is needed and that
the analysis of social media accounts offers significant and untapped
intelligence and insight into these organizations. As Castillo concluded in his
study, the Mexican State’s core strategy of targeting DTO leaders is
insufficient to weaken these organizations and limit their power over civil
society. The Mexican State should start developing its own Inform and
Influence campaigns in order to counteract the influence of Mexican DTOs.50
In doing so, cooperation with the Private Sector and, specifically, social media
companies to limit the online presence and activities of these organizations,
will be fundamental. Several lessons can be learned from the efforts of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France in combating the terrorist use
of the Internet.

Future Research
This study has demonstrated that there is sufficient information in the
Facebook profiles of the members of Mexican DTOs to conduct Social
Network Analyses on targeted individuals or cells. This research intends to
serve as the foundation for future studies of this nature. Furthermore, this
study has demonstrated that there are significant differences in the nature of
the use of social media across DTOs. These differences are directly related to
50
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the individual character, narco-culture, and ideology of each group. Further
research of this aspect of the use of social media by DTOs could provide
significant insight into the internal dynamics of each organization. Finally,
the research conducted for this study demonstrated that there is a staggering
absence of information regarding the incorporation of the analysis of social
media in the anti-narcotics strategy in Mexico and in Latin America, opening
a promising path for academic research and policy recommendations in the
field.
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Appendix
Table 3. User Account Demographics and Location by Cartel
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Table 4. The Internal Dynamics of Mexican DTOs
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